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Abstract
In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We con-
sider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this
setting, proportional representation requires that cohesive groups of voters are represented
proportionally in each initial segment of the ranking. Proportional rankings are desirable in
situations where initial segments of different lengths may be relevant, e.g., hiring decisions
(if it is unclear how many positions are to be filled), the presentation of competing proposals
on a liquid democracy platform (if it is unclear how many proposals participants are taking
into consideration), or recommender systems (if a ranking has to accommodate different user
types). We study the proportional representation provided by several ranking methods and
prove theoretical guarantees. Furthermore, we experimentally evaluate these methods and
present preliminary evidence as to which methods are most suitable for producing propor-
tional rankings.
1 Introduction
Consider a population with dichotomous (approval) preferences over a set of 300 alternatives. As-
sume that 50% of the population approves of the first 100 alternatives, 30% of the next 100 alter-
natives, and 20% of the last 100 ones. Imagine that we want to obtain a ranking of the alternatives
that in some sense reflects the preferences of the population. Perhaps the most straightforward
approach is to use Approval Voting, i.e., to rank the alternatives from the most frequently approved
to the least frequently approved. A striking property of the resulting ranking is that half of the
population does not approve any of the first 100 alternatives in the ranking.
In many scenarios, rankings obtained by applying Approval Voting are highly unsatisfactory;
rather, it is desirable to interleave alternatives supported by different (sufficiently large) groups.
For instance, consider an anonymous user using a search engine to find results for the query
“Armstrong”. Even if 50% of the users performing this search would like to see results for Neil
Armstrong, 30% for Lance Armstrong, and 20% for Louis Armstrong, it is not desirable to put only
results referring to Neil Armstrong in the top part of the ranking shown on the first page; rather,
results related to each of the Armstrongs should be displayed in appropriately high positions.
There are numerous applications where such diversity within collective rankings is desirable.
For instance, consider recommendation systems which aim at accommodating different types of
users (the estimated preferences of these user types should be represented proportionally to their
likelihood), a human-resource department providing hiring recommendations when it is unclear
how many positions are to be filled, or committee elections with some additional structure (e.g.,
when we want to elect a committee with a chairman and vice-chairman, as well as substitute
members). Another example application in which diversity in rankings is relevant is liquid democ-
racy (Behrens et al., 2014). A defining feature of a liquid democracy is that all participants are
allowed—and encouraged—to contribute to the decision making process. In particular, in a con-
text where one (or more) out of several competing alternatives needs to be selected, each partic-
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ipant can propose their own alternative if they are not satisfied with the existing ones. This may
lead to situations where a very large number of proposals needs to be considered. Since it can-
not be expected that every participant studies all available alternatives before making a decision,
the order in which competing alternatives are presented plays a crucial role (Behrens et al., 2014,
Chapter 4.10).
Indeed, the idea of diversified rankings with respect to the preferences of a population appears
in several literatures. For example, in the context of search engines, this aim is often referred to as
diversifying search results (Welch, Cho, and Olston, 2011; Santos, MacDonald, and Ounis, 2015;
Kingrani, Levene, and Zhang, 2015; Wang, Luo, and Yu, 2016). There are also models which
incorporate this idea into online advertising (see the work of Hu et al., 2011, and the references
therein). In the context of liquid democracy, Behrens et al. observe that using AV gives rise to what
they call the “noisy minorities” problem: relatively small groups of very active participants can
“flood” the system with their contributions, creating the impression that their opinion is much more
popular than it actually is. This is problematic insofar as other alternatives (that are potentially
much more popular) run the risk of being “buried” and not getting sufficient exposure. Behrens et
al. suggest that in order to prevent this problem, the ranking mechanism needs to ensure that the
order adequately reflects the opinions of the participants.
In this paper, we propose an abstract model applicable to all these applications, and initiate a
formal axiomatic study of the problem of finding a proportional collective ranking. In our study,
we use tools from the political and social sciences, and in particular we adapt the concept of
proportional representation (Balinski and Young, 1982; Monroe, 1995) to the case of rankings.
Informally, proportional representation requires that the extent to which a particular preference
or opinion is represented in the outcome should be proportional to the frequency with which this
preference or opinion occurs within the population. For instance, proportional representation is of-
ten a requirement in the context of parliamentary elections (Pukelsheim, 2014), where candidates
are grouped into political parties and voters express preferences over parties. If a party receives,
say, 20% of the votes, then proportional representation requires that this party should be allocated
(roughly) 20% of the parliamentary seats (see Laslier, 2012, for a discussion of arguments for and
against proportional representation in a political context).
The concept of proportional representation can be extended to the case of rankings in a very
natural way. Intuitively, we say that a ranking τ is proportional if each prefix of τ , viewed as a
subset of alternatives, satisfies (some form of) proportional representation. We will require that,
for each “sufficiently large” group of voters with consistent preferences, a proportional number of
alternatives approved by this group is ranked appropriately high in the ranking. The position of
such alternatives in the ranking depends on the level of their support, indicated by the size and the
cohesiveness of the corresponding group of voters.
Our Contribution. The contribution of this paper is as follows: (i) We formalize the concept of
proportionality of a ranking and introduce a quantitative way measuring it, (ii) we observe that sev-
eral known multiwinner rules satisfying committee monotonicity can be viewed as rankings rules,
(iii) we provide theoretical bounds on the proportional representation of several ranking rules, and
(iv) we experimentally evaluate ranking rules with respect to our measures of proportionality.
Related Work Proportional Representation is traditionally studied in settings where a subset of
alternatives (such as a parliament or a committee) needs to be chosen. The setting that is most
often studied is that of closed party lists, where alternatives are grouped into pairwise disjoint par-
ties and voters are restricted to select a single party (Gallagher, 1991). In this setting, providing
proportional representation reduces to solving an apportionment problem (Balinski and Young,
1982; Pukelsheim, 2014). In an influential paper, Monroe (1995) generalized the concept of pro-
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portional representation to settings where voter preferences are given as rank-orderings over the
set of all alternatives. For approval preferences, concepts capturing proportional representation
have recently been introduced by Aziz et al. (2015) and Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2016).
The setting considered in this paper differs from all of the above settings in that we are in-
terested in ranking the alternatives, rather than choosing a subset of them. To the best of our
knowledge, proportional rankings based on approval preferences have not been considered in the
literature. In the context of linear (i.e., rank-order) preferences, proportional rankings are dis-
cussed by Schulze (2011). However, this paper neither proposes a measure of proportionality, nor
does it compare the proportionality provided by different rules.
2 Preliminaries
For s ∈ N, we write [s] = {1, . . . , s}. For each set X , we let S(X) and Sk(X) denote the set of
all subsets of X , and the set of all k-element subsets of X , respectively.
Let N = [n] be a finite set of voters and A = {c1, . . . cm} a finite set of m alternatives. Each
voter i ∈ N approves a non-empty subset of alternatives Ai ⊆ A. For each a ∈ A, we write Na
for the set of voters who approve a, i.e., Na = {i ∈ N : a ∈ Ai}. We refer to |Na| as the approval
score of a. A list P = (A1, . . . , An) of approval sets, one for each voter i ∈ N , is called a profile
on (A,N).
A ranking is a linear order over A. For a ranking r and for k ∈ [m], we denote the k-th
element in r by rk. Thus, r can be represented by the list (r1, r2, . . . , rm). Given a ranking
r = (r1, . . . , rm) and k ∈ [m], we let r≤k = {r1, . . . , rk} denote the subset of A consisting of the
top k elements according to r. An (approval-based) ranking rule f maps a profile P on (A,N) to
a ranking f(P ) over A.
In what follows, we consider several ranking rules that can be obtained by adapting existing
multiwinner rules. An (approval-based) multiwinner rule takes as input a profile P on (A,N) and
an integer k ∈ [m] and outputs a k-element subset of A, referred to as the winning committee.
A generic adaptation of multiwinner rules to ranking rules is possible whenever the respective
multiwinner rule R has the property that R(P, k − 1) ⊆ R(P, k) for all k ≤ m (this property
is known as committee monotonicity or house monotonicity): whenever this is the case, we can
produce a ranking by placing the unique alternative inR(P, k) \ R(P, k − 1) in position k.
We consider the following ranking rules.1 Fix a profile P on (A,N).
Approval Voting (AV). Approval Voting ranks the alternatives in order of their approval score,
so that |Nr1 | ≥ · · · ≥ |Nrm |.
Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV). This family of rules is based on ideas developed by Dan-
ish polymath Thorvald Thiele (Thiele, 1895). It is parameterized by weight vectors,
i.e., sequences (w1, w2, . . . ) of nonnegative reals. For a given weight vector w =
(w1, w2, . . . ) and a subset S ⊆ A of alternatives, define the w-RAV score of S as
w(S) =
∑
i∈N
∑|Ai∩S|
j=1 wj . The intuition behind this score is that voters prefer sets S that
contain more of their approved alternatives, but that there are decreasing marginal returns to
adding further such alternatives to S (ifw is decreasing). The rulew-RAV constructs a rank-
ing iteratively, starting with the empty partial ranking r = (). In step k ∈ [m], it appends
to r an alternative a with maximum marginal contribution w(r≤k−1 ∪ {a}) − w(r≤k−1)
among all yet unranked alternatives. Many interesting rules belong to this family for suitable
weight vectors w. For example, AV is simply (1, 1, 1, . . .)-RAV, Sequential Proportional
1All rules that we describe may have to break ties at some point in the execution; we adopt an adversarial approach to
tie-breaking, i.e., we say that a ranking rule satisfies a property only if it satisfies it for all possible ways of breaking ties.
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A1 = {c1, c2, c3, c4}
A2 = {c1, c2, c3, c4}
A3 = {c1, c2, c3, c4}
A4 = {c5, c6}
A5 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}
A6 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}
A7 = {c1, c6}
Figure 1: Illustration of the load distribution produced by Phragme´n’s rule in Example 1.
Approval Voting (SeqPAV) is defined as wPAV-RAV, where wPAV = (1, 1/2, 1/3, . . .), Greedy
Chamberlin–Courant is defined as (1, 0, 0, . . .)-RAV, and for every p > 1, the p-geometric
rule is given by (1/p, 1/p2, 1/p3, . . .)-RAV.
Reverse SeqPAV. This rule is a bottom-up variant of SeqPAV. It builds a ranking starting with the
lowest-ranked alternative. Initially it sets S = A and r = (). Then, at each step it picks an
alternative a minimizing wPAV(S)−wPAV(S \ {a}), removes it from S and prepends it to r.
Phragme´n’s Rule. Phragme´n (1895) proposed a committee selection rule based on a load balanc-
ing approach: every alternative incurs a load of one unit, and the load of alternative a has
to be distributed among all voters in Na. Phragme´n’s rule constructs a ranking iteratively,
starting with the empty partial ranking r = (). Initially, the load of each voter is 0. At each
step, the rule picks a yet unranked alternative and distributes its associated load of 1 over
the voters who approve it; the alternative and the load distribution scheme are chosen so as
to minimize the maximum load across all voters. This alternative is then appended to the
ranking r. (For details, see the work of Janson, 2012, and Mora and Oliver, 2015).
The following example illustrates the ranking rules defined above.
Example 1. Consider the following profile with 7 voters and 6 alternatives:
A1 = A2 = A3 = {c1, c2, c3, c4} A4 = {c5, c6}
A5 = A6 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5} A7 = {c1, c6}
Assume lexicographic tie-breaking. Since the approval scores of the alternatives c1, . . . , c6 are
equal to 6, 5, 5, 5, 3, and 2, respectively, Approval Voting returns the ranking (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6).
SeqPAV in the first iteration selects an alternative with the highest approval score, i.e., c1. In
the second iteration, the marginal contribution of alternatives c2, . . . , c6 to the PAV-score are equal
to 5/2, 5/2, 5/2, 2, and 3/2, respectively. Thus, SeqPAV selects c2. In the next iterations, the rule
appends c3, c5, c4, and finally c6 to the ranking.
Let us now consider Reverse SeqPAV. Removing alternative c1 from {c1, . . . , c6} decreases
the PAV-score of the voters by 3 · 14 + 2 · 15 + 12 = 1.65. Removing alternatives c2, . . . , c6 from
{c1, . . . , c6} decreases the PAV-score of the voters by 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 0.9 and 1.0, repectively. Thus,
alternative c5 is put in the last position of the ranking produced by Reverse SeqPAV. The whole
ranking returned by this rule is (c1, c2, c3, c6, c4, c5).
The reader can easily verify that the 2-geometric rule and the Greedy Chamberlin–Courant
rule return the rankings (c1, c5, c2, c3, c4, c6) and (c1, c2, c5, c3, c6, c4), respectively.
Finally, Phragme´n’s rule returns the ranking (c1, c2, c3, c6, c4, c5). The corresponding load
distribution is illustrated in Figure 1.
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3 Measures of Proportionality
In this section, we define a measure of proportionality for rankings and then extend it to ranking
rules. In what follows, let P be a profile on (A,N) with |A| = m.
Given a group of voters N ′ ⊆ N and a set of alternatives S ⊆ A, a natural measure of the
group’s “satisfaction” provided by S is the average number of alternatives in S that are approved
by a voter in N ′. Thus, we define
avg(N ′, S) =
1
|N ′|
∑
i∈N ′
|Ai ∩ S|.
We refer to avg(N ′, S) as the average representation of N ′ with respect to S. To extend this idea
to rankings, we consider the case where the subset S is an initial segment of a given ranking r, i.e.,
S = r≤k for some k ∈ [m]. Intuitively, every group N ′ wants to have an average representation
avg(N ′, r≤k) that is as large as possible, for all k ∈ [m]. Now, whether a group of voters deserves
to be represented in the top positions of a ranking depends on two parameters: its relative size
and its cohesiveness, i.e., the number of alternatives that are unanimously approved by the group
members. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 1. (Significant groups) Consider a profile P on (A,N). For a group N ′ ⊆ N , its
proportion α(N ′) is given by α(N ′) = |N
′|
|N | , and its cohesiveness λ(N
′) is given by λ(N ′) =
|⋂i∈N ′ Ai|. Given α ∈ (0, 1] and λ ∈ [m], we say that N ′ is (α, λ)-significant in P if |N ′| =
dαne and λ(N ′) ≥ λ.
The following definition captures the intuitively compelling idea that a group can demand to be
proportionally represented in the top positions of the ranking, as long as the number of demanded
alternatives does not exceed the cohesiveness of the group.
Definition 2. (Justifiable demand) The justifiable demand of a group N ′ ⊆ N with respect to
the top k positions of a ranking is defined as
jd(N ′, k) = min(bα(N ′) · kc, λ(N ′)).
For example, if a group contains 25% of the voters and has a cohesiveness of 3, it has a
justifiable demand of 1 with respect to the top four positions, a justifiable demand of 2 with respect
to the top eight positions, and a justifiable demand of 3 with respect to the top twelve positions,
which is also its maximum justifiable demand.
It would be desirable to find a rule that provides every group with an average representation
that meets the group’s justifiable demand. However, the following example shows that this is not
always possible.
Example 2. Let A = {a, b, c} and n = 6 and consider the profile P given by A1 = {a},
A2 = {a, b}, A3 = {b}, A4 = {b, c}, A5 = {c}, and A6 = {a, c}. Consider the ranking
r = (a, b, c). The group N ′ = {4, 5, 6} has α(N ′) = 1/2, λ(N ′) = 1. Therefore, its justifiable
demand with respect to the top two positions is jd(N ′, 2) = min(b1/2 · 2c, 1) = 1. However, its
average representation with respect to the top two positions of r is only avg(N ′, {a, b}) = 2/3.
Since P is completely symmetric with respect to the alternatives, we can find such a group for
every other ranking as well.
This example shows that it may not be feasible to provide each group with the level of repre-
sentation that meets its justifiable demand, but it might be possible to guarantee a large fraction of
it. For instance, in the previous example it is possible to ensure that avg(N ′, k) ≥ 2/3 · jd(N ′, k)
for all groups N ′ and for all k ≤ 3. This observation leads to the following definition.
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Definition 3. (Optimal ranking) We define the quality of a ranking r for a profile P as
qP (r) = min
k∈[m],N ′⊆N :
jd(N ′,k)>0
avg(N ′, r≤k)
jd(N ′, k)
.
An optimal ranking for P is a ranking in arg maxr qP (r).
We observe that qP (r) is well-defined, i.e., the set of pairs (N ′, k) such that jd(N ′, k) > 0 is
always non-empty. Indeed, consider an alternative a with the highest approval score: as Ai 6= ∅
for all i ∈ N , by the pigeonhole principle we have |Na| ≥ n/m. Moreover, λ(Na) ≥ 1, so
jd(Na,m) ≥ min(n/mn ·m, 1) = 1. Example 2 illustrates that the quality of an optimal ranking
may be less than 1.
Unfortunately, good rankings are hard to compute.
Theorem 1. Given a profile P , it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists a ranking r with
qP (r) ≥ 1.
Proof. We give a reduction from VERTEX COVER. An instance of this problem is given by a graph
G = (V,E) and an integer `. It is a ‘yes’-instance if there is a subset of ` vertices S ⊆ V such
that each edge in E contains some vertex in S. We can assume that G is 3-regular, as VERTEX
COVER remains NP-hard in this case (Garey and Johnson, 1979).
Given a vertex cover instance (G, `) withG = (V,E), we construct an instance of the problem
of finding an optimal ranking in the following way. Since the degree of each vertex is exactly 3,
we can assume that 3` ≥ |E|: instances with 3` < |E| are trivially ‘no’-instances. We set
A = V ∪ {d}, where d is a dummy alternative. For every edge {a, b} ∈ E we create a voter that
approves {a, b}. We also add 3`+ 3− |E| ≥ 3 dummy voters who approve d only. Consequently,
n = |N | = 3` + 3. Since the graph is 3-regular, we have m = |A| = 2|E|/3 + 1 ≤ 3`. This
defines the profile P . We will show that G has a vertex cover of size ` if and only if there exists a
ranking r with qP (r) ≥ 1, i.e., avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥ jd(N ′, k) for all N ′ ⊆ N and k ∈ [m].
⇒: Let S ⊆ V be a vertex cover of size `. Consider a ranking where d is ranked first, the
next ` positions are occupied by elements of S (in arbitrary order), followed by the remaining
alternatives (also in arbitrary order). Consider a group of voters N ′ ⊆ N and an integer k ∈ [m];
if λ(N ′) = 0 then trivially avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥ jd(N ′, k) = 0, so assume that λ(N ′) > 0. We
consider the following cases:
• N ′ ⊆ Nd. Then λ(N ′) = 1, so for each k ∈ [m] we have avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥ avg(N ′, r≤1) =
1 = λ(N ′) ≥ jd(N ′, k).
• N ′ ∩ Nd = ∅, |N ′| > 1. Since the intersection of two or more edges contains at most one
vertex and the degree of each vertex is 3, we have λ(N ′) = 1 and |N ′| ≤ 3. For k ≤ `,
we obtain jd(N ′, k) ≤ min(b 33`+3 · kc, 1) = 0; for k ≥ ` + 1, we have jd(N ′, k′) ≤
1. Since r≤`+1 = S ∪ {d} and S is a vertex cover for G, it holds that avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥
avg(N ′, r≤`+1) ≥ 1 ≥ jd(N ′, k).
• N ′ ∩Nd = ∅, |N ′| = 1, i.e., N ′ contains a single edge voter. Then jd(N ′, k) ≤ α(N ′, k) ≤
k
3`+3 < 1 for all k ≤ m (recall that m ≤ 3`), so jd(N ′, k) = 0 for all k ∈ [m].
Hence avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥ jd(N ′, k) for all N ′ ⊆ N , k ∈ [m].
⇐: Consider a ranking r with avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥ jd(N ′, k) for all N ′ ⊆ N and k ∈ [m].
We claim that d ∈ r≤`+1 and S = r≤`+1 \ {d} is a vertex cover. Note that we have Nd ≥ 3,
λ(Nd) = 1, so jd(Nd, ` + 1) ≥ min( 33`+3(` + 1), 1) = 1. As voters in Nd only approve d,
alternative d has to appear in the first `+1 positions of the ranking. Similarly, for every alternative
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a ∈ A we have Na = 3, so α(Na) = 33`+3 and λ(Na) = 1. For k = `+ 1, the justifiable demand
of Na is jd(Na, k) = min(
3(`+1)
3`+3 , 1) = 1. Now suppose that there exists an edge e = {a, b} with
e ∩ S = ∅. Let Na = {e, e′, e′′}; we have |e′ ∩ S| ≤ 1, |e′′ ∩ S| ≤ 1, so avg(Na, S) ≤ 2/3, a
contradiction. We conclude that S = r≤`+1 \ {d} is a vertex cover.
Further, a fairly straightforward reduction from the Maximum k-Subset Intersection prob-
lem (Xavier, 2012) shows that even the problem of deciding whether there exists an (α, λ)-
significant group of voters is NP-hard.
Proposition 1. The problem of deciding whether there exists an (α, λ)-significant group of voters
is NP-complete.
Proof. It is clear that the problem belongs to NP. Below we show that it is NP-hard.
Let I be an instance of the Maximum k-Subset Intersection problem. In I we are given a
collection S = {S1, . . . , Sm} of m subsets over a set of n elements E = {e1, . . . , en}, and
two positive integers, λ and β. We ask whether there exists a subcollection of λ sets from S,
{Sj1 , . . . , Sjλ}, such that |Sj1 ∩ . . . ∩ Sjλ | ≥ β.
From I we can construct an instance of the problem of deciding whether there exists an (α, λ)-
significant group of voters, in the following way. We associate sets from S with alternatives, and
the elements from E with voters (a voter ei approves of an alternative Sj if ei ∈ Sj). We set
α = β|S| . It is easy to see that for each λ alternatives Sj1 , . . . , Sjλ , |Sj1 ∩ . . . ∩ Sjλ | is the size
of the largest group of voters who all approve the λ alternatives, and that there exists an (α, λ)-
significant group of voters if and only if there exist λ alternatives that are all approved by some β
voters.
The measure qP (r) can be lifted from individual rankings to ranking rules: we can measure
the quality of a ranking rule f as the minimum value of qP (f(P )), over all possible profiles P .
However, in our theoretical analysis of ranking rules we take the following approach, which as-
sumes more flexibility on the part of groups of voters that seek to be represented: given a group
of proportion α and with cohesiveness at least λ, we ask at which point in the ranking the average
satisfaction of this group reaches λ. This guarantee is given by the function κ(α, λ) and formally
defined as follows.
Definition 4. (κ-group representation) Let κ(α, λ) be a function from ((0, 1] ∩Q)× N to N. A
ranking r provides κ-group representation (κ-GR) for profile P if for all rational α ∈ (0, 1], all
λ ∈ N, and all voter groups N ′ ⊆ N that are (α, λ)-significant in P it holds that
avg(N ′, r≤κ(α,λ)) ≥ λ.
A ranking rule f satisfies κ-group representation (κ-GR) if f(P ) provides κ-group representation
for every profile P .
Let us now explore the differences between the two measures, the worst-case quality of the
ranking qP (f(P )), and κ-group representation. While qP (f(P )) is just a single number, κ-group
representation carries more information. In particular, it makes it possible to express the fact that
some groups are better represented in the top parts of the resulting ranking than further below (as
would be suggested by κ being a convex function over λ). As a more concrete example, assume
that qP (f(P )) < 1/2 and consider a group N ′ that is (1/10,m/2)-significant. Since the justified
demand of this group is upper bounded by m/10, qP (f(P )) does not say anything about how
far we need to go down the ranking to obtain an average representation greater than λ > m/20
(the justifiable demand of N ′ is at most m/10 and f guarantees only half of it), while κ-group
representation provides such information for each λ ∈ [1,m/2].
In the next section, we investigate guarantees in terms of κ-group representation provided by
the ranking rules that we introduced above.
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4 Theoretical Guarantees of Ranking Rules
We start our analysis with the simplest of our rules, namely, Approval Voting. Interestingly, Ap-
proval Voting provides very good guarantees to majorities, that is, groups with α(N ′) ≥ 1/2.
However, for minorities it provides no guarantees at all.
Theorem 2. For rational α > 1/2, Approval Voting satisfies κ(α, λ)-group representation for
κ(α, λ) =
⌈
λα
2α−1
⌉
, but fails it for κ(α, λ) =
⌈
λα
2α−1
⌉− 1. For α < 1/2, Approval Voting does not
satisfy κ(α, λ)-group representation for any function κ(α, λ).
Proof. We first prove that for α > 1/2 Approval Voting satisfies κ(α, λ)-group representation for
κ(α, λ) = d λα2α−1e. Consider a group of voters N ′ ⊆ N with n′ = |N ′| = dαne, λ(N ′) ≥ λ.
Let k =
⌈
λα
2α−1
⌉
, and let r be the ranking returned by Approval Voting. Assume for the sake of
contradiction that avg(N ′, r≤k) < λ. Then there exists some alternative h that is approved by
all voters in N ′, but does not appear in the top k positions of r. Thus, each alternative in r≤k is
approved by at least dαne voters and hence by at least 2dαne − n voters in N ′. Hence,
avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥ k · 2dαne − ndαne ≥ k ·
2αn− n
αn
≥ λ.
This contradiction proves our first claim.
Now, we will show that Approval Voting does not satisfy κ(α, λ)-group representation for
κ(α, λ) =
⌈
λα
2α−1
⌉−1. Fix α ∈ (0, 1]∩Q and λ ∈ N and let k = ⌈ λα2α−1⌉−1 < λα2α−1 . As α ∈ Q,
there exist some integers x and n such that α = x/n. Let A = A′ ∪ A′′, where |A′| = |A′′| = k
and A′ ∩ A′′ = ∅. Consider a profile on (A,N) that contains two groups of voters G and F with
sizes |G| = |F | = x = αn, such that G and F have the smallest possible intersection. That is, for
α ≤ 1/2 the sets G and F are disjoint, and for α > 1/2 we have |G ∩ F | = (2α − 1)n. Suppose
that each voter in G approves all alternatives in A′ and each voter in F approves all alternatives
in A′′. Approval Voting may rank A′ in the first k positions. Thus,
avg(F, r≤k) = k · (2α− 1)n
αn
< λ.
Finally, let us prove that for α ≤ 1/2 Approval Voting does not satisfy κ(α, λ)-group represen-
tation for any function κ(α, λ). For the sake of contradiction let us assume that this is not the case.
Let us fix α ∈ (0, 1], λ ∈ N, and let k = κ(α, λ). Using the same idea as in the previous para-
graph, we obtain an instance where there is a set of voters N ′ with |N ′| = αn, λ(N ′) = |N ′| ≥ λ
such that no voter inN ′ approves any of the alternatives appearing in top k positions of the ranking
returned by Approval Voting. This gives a contradiction and proves our claim.
In contrast, Phragme´n’s rule, SeqPAV and p-geometric rules, provide reasonable guarantees
for all values of α and λ.
Theorem 3. Phragme´n’s rule satisfies κ(α, λ)-group representation for κ(α, λ) = d 5λ
α2
+ 1αe.
Proof. Fix α ∈ (0, 1], λ ∈ N, a profile P , and a group of voters N ′ ⊆ N such that n′ = |N ′| =
dαne and λ(N ′) ≥ λ. Set y = 1/n′. Let `i(t) denote the load of voter i after the t-th step of
Phragme´n’s rule. Let µ(t) = maxi∈N ′ `i(t), i.e., µ(t) is the maximum load across all voters from
N ′ after the t-th step. Further, define the excess of voter i at step t as ei(t) = µ(t) − `i(t), set
δi(t) = `i(t)− `i(t− 1), and let
E(t) =
∑
i∈N ′
ei(t) and S(t) =
∑
i∈N ′
ei(t)
2.
8
N ′
N \N ′
µ(t)
ℓ1(t)
ℓ2(t)
ℓi(t)
ei(t)
E(t)
area:
Figure 2: Illustration of the notation used in the proof of Theorem 3.
The above definitions are illustrated in Figure 2.
Let k = d 5λ
α2
+ 1αe and let r be ranking returned by Phragme´n’s rule. For the sake of contra-
diction, let us assume that avg(N ′, r≤k) < λ. Then during the first k steps of the rule there exists
an alternative that is approved by all members of N ′, but has not yet been selected by the rule;
denote this alternative by h.
First, we prove that for all t ∈ [k] it holds that E(t) ≤ 1. In fact, we will prove a stronger
claim: ∑
i∈N ′
(
max
i∈N
`i(t)− `i(t)
)
≤ 1. (1)
(The claim is stronger because we take the maximum over all voters rather than over the voters
from N ′.) Indeed, suppose for the sake of contradiction that this is not the case; let t be the first
step of the algorithm where Inequality (1) is violated. Since the loads of all voters monotonically
increase, we have M = maxi∈N `i(t) > maxi∈N `i(t − 1), i.e., the maximum load strictly
increases. However, since E(t) > 1, the algorithm could have selected h and distributed the
associated load in such a way that the maximum load is lower than M , a contradiction. Thus,
E(t) ≤ 1 for each t ∈ [k].
Second, we prove that ∑
i∈N ′
`i(k) ≥ n′
(k
n
− y
)
. (2)
Again, for the sake of contradiction assume that
∑
i∈N ′ `i(k) < n
′( k
n − y
)
= n′ kn − 1. Note
that the total load assigned to the voters after k steps of the algorithm is equal to k. Thus, by the
pigeonhole principle, after the k-th round the load of some voter is at least kn . Let t be the first
round where the load of some voter is at least kn . We have∑
i∈N ′
`i(t) ≤
∑
i∈N ′
`i(k) < n
′ k
n
− 1.
Thus, the rule could have chosen h and distributed the associated load in such a way that the
load of each voter is less than kn , a contradiction. This proves Inequality (2). Since n
′( kn − y) =
n′ kn − 1 ≥ αk − 1, we infer that∑
i∈N ′
k∑
t=1
δi(t) =
∑
i∈N ′
k∑
t=1
(
`i(t)−`i(t−1)
)
=
∑
i∈N ′
(
`i(k)−`i(0)
)
=
∑
i∈N ′
`i(k) ≥ αk−1. (3)
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Further, let us investigate the relationship between the average representation of voters from
N ′ and the value S(t). First, observe that µ(t + 1) − µ(t) ≤ y: indeed, if that was not the case,
the algorithm could have chosen h at step t and distributed the associated load uniformly among
the voters in N ′ to achieve a lower maximum load.
Consider a voter i ∈ N ′. Since µ(t + 1) − µ(t) ≤ y, it follows that δi(t + 1) ≤ ei(t) + y.
Multiplying by −2δi(t+ 1), we obtain
−2(y + ei(t))δi(t+ 1) + δ2i (t+ 1) ≤ −δ2i (t+ 1). (4)
Also, for all t ∈ [k − 1] we have
ei(t+ 1) ≤ ei(t) + y − δi(t+ 1). (5)
We are ready to assess the value S(t+ 1)− S(t):
S(t+ 1)− S(t) =
∑
i∈N ′
(
e2i (t+ 1)− e2i (t)
)
(6)
≤
∑
i∈N ′
(
(ei(t) + y − δi(t+ 1))2 − e2i (t)
)
(7)
=
∑
i∈N ′
(
2ei(t)y − 2(y + ei(t))δi(t+ 1) + y2 + δ2i (t+ 1)
)
(8)
≤
∑
i∈N ′
(
2ei(t)y − δ2i (t+ 1) + y2
)
(9)
= 2yE(t) + y2n′ −
∑
i∈N ′
δ2i (t+ 1) (10)
≤ 3y −
∑
i∈N ′
δ2i (t+ 1). (11)
In the above sequence of inequalities, (7) follows from (5), (8) and (10) follow by simple algebraic
operations, (9) is a consequence of (4), and (11) follows from the fact that E(t) ≤ 1 and yn′ = 1.
As a result, we get
0 ≤ S(k)− S(0) =
k∑
t=1
(
S(t)− S(t− 1)
)
≤ 3ky −
∑
i∈N ′
k∑
t=1
δ2i (t),
and thus
∑
i∈N ′
∑k
t=1 δ
2
i (t) ≤ 3ky.
To summarize, we obtained an upper bound of 3ky on the sum of squares of the variables from
{δi(t)}i∈N ′,t∈[k] and a lower bound of αk − 1 on their sum. Now, we move to the main step of
our proof: we will use these two bounds to assess the total number of representatives of the voters
from N ′ in top k positions.
Let zi(t) = 1 if δi(t) is positive and zi(t) = 0 otherwise. Note that if zi(t) = 1, this
means that voter i gets one more representative at step t. It follows that avg(N ′, r≤k) ≥
1
n′
∑
i∈N ′
∑k
t=1 zi(t).
Recall that the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality states that for every pair of sequences of n real
values, (u1, . . . , uν) and (v1, . . . , vν) it holds that(
ν∑
i=1
uivi
)2
≤
(
ν∑
i=1
u2i
)(
ν∑
i=1
v2i
)
. (12)
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Applying this inequality, we get(∑
i∈N ′
k∑
t=1
δi(t)
)2
=
(∑
i∈N ′
k∑
t=1
zi(t)δi(t)
)2
≤
(∑
i∈N ′
k∑
t=1
z2i (t)
)(∑
i∈N ′
k∑
t=1
δ2i (t)
)
.
We infer that z =
∑
i∈N ′
∑k
t=1 z
2
i (t) ≥ (αk−1)
2
3ky . Now, recall that
5λ
α2
+ 1α ≤ k ≤ 5λα2 + 1α + 1, and
hence αk − 1 ≥ 5λα . We have
z
n′
≥ (
5λ
α )
2
3k
≥ (
5λ
α )
2
3( 5λ
α2
+ 1α + 1)
≥
25λ2
α2
3 · 7λ
α2
≥ λ.
Here the inequality 5λ
α2
+ 1α + 1 ≤ 7λα2 follows from the fact that α ≤ 1, λ ≥ 1. This gives a
contradiction and completes the proof.
Now, let us provide some intuition behind the mathematical formulas and explain why it was
useful to consider the sum of squares, S(t). Phragme´n’s rule aims at distributing the load among
the voters as equally as possible. Intuitively, to show that on average the voters have a significant
number of representatives, one needs to show that, on average, when a voter gets an additional
representative, she is assigned a relatively small amount of load. In some sense S(i) can be
viewed as a potential function. In each step, this ‘potential function’ increases by a bounded
value. Yet, since the quadratic function is convex, when a voter gets an additional representative,
the potential function drops superlinearly with respect to the load `. This allows to infer that the
increase of the load of a voter getting an additional representative can be bounded; formally, this
is accomplished by using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Considering the sum of squares of the
values ei(t) allows us to invoke this inequality, yet we believe that similar bounds can be obtained
by considering other types of convex transformations of the values ei(t).
Let us recall the relation between arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic means. For each se-
quence of positive values, a1, . . . an, it holds that:
1
n
n∑
i=1
ai ≥ n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
ai ≥ n∑n
i=1
1
ai
. (13)
Theorem 4. SeqPAV satisfies κ(α, λ)-group representation for κ(α, λ) =
⌈2(λ+1)2
α2
⌉
.
Proof. Fix α ∈ (0, 1], λ ∈ N, a profile P , and a group of voters N ′ ⊆ N such that n′ = |N ′| =
dαne and λ(N ′) ≥ λ. Set k = ⌈2(λ+1)2
α2
⌉
. Let r be the ranking returned by SeqPAV.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that avg(N ′, r≤k) < λ and set z = n′ · avg(N ′, r≤k);
note that z < λn′. By our assumption, at the end of each step t ∈ [k] there exists some alternative
that is approved by all voters in N ′, but has not been ranked yet; let h be some such alternative.
For t ∈ [k + 1], consider the moment just before the t-th step of SeqPAV. Let ai(t) denote the
number of alternatives selected so far that appear in Ai, and let T (t) =
∑
i∈N
1
ai(t)+1
. Note that
n = T (1) ≥ T (2) ≥ . . . ≥ T (k + 1) ≥ 0. For each t ∈ [k + 1] we have∑
i∈N ′ ai(t) ≤ z.
From (13) we infer
z + n′
n′
≥
∑
i∈N ′(ai(t) + 1)
n′
≥ n
′∑
i∈N ′
1
ai(t)+1
,
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that is, ∑
i∈N ′
1
ai(t) + 1
≥ (n
′)2
z + n′
>
(n′)2
n′(λ+ 1)
=
n′
λ+ 1
.
Consider the alternative a selected by SeqPAV at step t, t ∈ [k]. Without loss of generality, assume
that Na = {1, . . . , s} at step t SeqPAV selects an alternative a that is approved by voters 1, . . . , s.
Since alternative h is available at this step, it has to be the case that SeqPAV favors a over h, i.e.,
for the harmonic weight vector w = (1, 1/2, 1/3, . . . ) we have w(r≤t−1 ∪ {a}) − w(r≤t−1) ≥
w(r≤t−1 ∪ {h})− w(r≤t−1). This implies
s∑
i=1
1
ai(t) + 1
≥
∑
i∈N ′
1
ai(t) + 1
>
n′
λ+ 1
.
Thus, we have
T (t)− T (t+ 1) =
s∑
i=1
( 1
ai(t) + 1
− 1
ai(t) + 2
)
=
s∑
i=1
1
(ai(t) + 1)(ai(t) + 2)
≥
s∑
i=1
1
2(ai(t) + 1)2
.
Applying the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality to ( 1a1(t)+1 , . . . ,
1
as(t)+1
) and (1, . . . , 1), we obtain
s∑
i=1
1
2(ai(t) + 1)2
≥ 1
2s
( s∑
i=1
1
ai(t) + 1
)2
>
1
2n
( n′
λ+ 1
)2 ≥ nα2
2(λ+ 1)2
.
Since the above inequality holds for each t ∈ [k], we have
T (1)− T (k + 1) =
k∑
t=1
(
T (t)− T (t+ 1)) > knα2
2(λ+ 1)2
≥ n.
Thus T (k + 1) < T (1)− n = n− n = 0, a contradiction. This completes the proof.
The technique developed in the proof of Theorem 4 can be used to provide similar bounds for
other RAV rules. In particular, for the p-geometric rule we obtain the following bound.
Theorem 5. For each p > 1, the p-geometric rule satisfies κ(α, λ)-group representation for
κ(α, λ) =
⌈ pλ+1
α(p−1)
⌉
.
Proof. We will use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 4. Fix α ∈ (0, 1], λ ∈ N, a profile
P , and a group of voters N ′ ⊆ N such that n′ = |N ′| = dαne and λ(N ′) ≥ λ. Set k = ⌈ pλ+1α(p−1)⌉.
Let r be the ranking returned by the p-geometric rule.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that avg(N ′, r≤k) < λ and set z = n′ · avg(N ′, r≤k);
note that z < λn′. By our assumption, at the end of each step t ∈ [k] there exists some alternative
that is approved by all voters in N ′, but has not been ranked yet; let h be some such alternative.
For t ∈ [k + 1], consider the moment just before the t-th step of the p-geometric rule. Let ai(t)
denote the number of alternatives selected so far that appear in Ai, and let T (t) =
∑
i∈N
1
pai(t)
.
Note that n = T (1) ≥ T (2) ≥ . . . ≥ T (k + 1) ≥ 0. We have∑
i∈N ′ ai(t) ≤ z.
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From the inequality between the geometric mean and the harmonic mean we infer∑
i∈N ′
1
pai(t)+1
≥ n
′
n′
√∏
i∈N ′ pai(t)+1
≥ n
′
p
z+n′
n′
>
n′
pλ+1
.
Consider the alternative a selected by the p-geometric rule at step t, t ∈ [k]; assume without loss
of generality that Na = {1, . . . , s}. By our assumption, alternative h is still available at that step.
This means that forw = (1, 1/p, . . . ) we have w(r≤t−1 ∪ {a})−w(r≤t−1) ≥ w(r≤t−1 ∪ {h})−
w(r≤t−1). This means that
s∑
i=1
1
pai(t)+1
≥
∑
i∈N ′
1
pai(t)+1
>
n′
pλ+1
,
and thus we have
T (t)− T (t+ 1) =
s∑
i=1
( 1
pai(t)
− 1
pai(t)+1
)
=
s∑
i=1
p− 1
pai(t)+1
= (p− 1)
s∑
i=1
1
pai(t)+1
> (p− 1) n
′
pλ+1
≥ nα(p− 1)
pλ+1
≥ n
k
.
Thus, we obtain
T (k + 1) < T (1)− k · n
k
= n− n = 0.
We reached a contradiction, which completes the proof.
Theorem 5 establishes a linear relationship between the proportion of the group α and the guar-
antee κ(α, λ). Thus, our bound for the p-geometric rule is better than our bounds for Phragme´n’s
rule and SeqPAV from Theorems 3 and 4, respectively. Further, as suggested by Example 2, a
linear relationship is the best we can hope for. Unfortunately, as a tradeoff we obtain an expo-
nential relationship between the required amount of representation λ and the guarantee κ(α, λ).
Nevertheless, Theorem 5 shows that if we are only interested in optimizing κ(α, λ) for a constant
value of λ > 1, the
(
λ+1
λ
)
-geometric rule provides very good guarantees for group representation.
Corollary 1. For a constant λ ∈ N, the (λ+1λ )-geometric rule satisfies κ(α, λ)-group representa-
tion for κ(α, λ) = d e(λ+1)α e.
Proof. For p = λ+1λ the formula for κ(α, λ) from Theorem 5 can be rewritten as follows:
pλ+1
α(p− 1) =
(
λ+1
λ
)λ+1
α
(
λ+1
λ − 1
) ≤ e · λ+1λ
α · 1λ
=
e(λ+ 1)
α
.
For Reverse SeqPAV, we have not been able to establish an analogue of Theorems 3, 4 and 5.
However, we can obtain a bound on κ(α, λ) for each α ∈ (0, 1] and for some sufficiently large λ.
Our proof is based on two observations, formalized as Lemma 1 and 2, below.
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Lemma 1. Consider a group of voters,N ′, and a set of alternatives,A′ ⊆ A, with a total approval
score of the voters N ′ from A′ equal to z, i.e.,
∑
i∈N ′ |Ai ∩A| = z. Assume that Reverse SeqPAV
removes one alternative from A′ and this results in decreasing the total approval score of N ′ to
z′ < z. Then it holds that removing any alternative decreases the PAV-score by at least (z−z
′)2
z .
Proof. Since the total satisfaction of voters from N ′ decreases by z − z′, it means that there are
z − z′ voters in N ′ who, after removing the alternative, lose one of their representatives. Let us
rename these voters to i1, . . . iz−z′ . Let a(i) denote the number of representatives of the i-th voter
just before removing the alternative from A′. It holds that:
z
z − z′ ≥
∑z−z′
j=1 a(ij)
z − z′ ≥
z − z′∑z−z′
j=1
1
a(ij)
,
where the last inequality follows from the inequality between the arithmetic and the harmonic
means. After reformulating the above inequality, we get that:
z−z′∑
j=1
1
a(ij)
≥ (z − z
′)2
z
.
Thus, as a result of removing the alternative from A′, the PAV-score of the voters decreases by at
least (z−z
′)2
z . The statement of the lemma holds since Reverse SeqPAV selects an alternative that
decreases the PAV-score of the voters the least.
Lemma 2. Consider a set of alternatives, A′ ⊆ A. Assume that Reverse SeqPAV removes an
alternative from A′ and this decreases the PAV-score of the voters by ∆. It holds that |A| ≤ n/∆.
Proof. Let a(i) denote the number of representatives of the i-th voter just before removing the
alternative from A′. Consider an alternative y ∈ A. Let i1, . . ., ip be the voters that approve of y.
Since Reverse SeqPAV selects an alternative that decreases the PAV-score of the voters the least, it
holds that:
p∑
j=1
1
a(ij)
≥ ∆.
Summing up the left sides of the above inequality over all alternatives from A′ we get that:
∑
i∈N
a(i)∑
j=1
1
a(i)
≥ |A|∆.
Which gives that:
∑
i∈N
a(i)∑
j=1
1
a(i)
=
∑
i∈N
1 = n ≥ |A|∆,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 6. Let α ∈ (0, 1], λ ∈ N, and let N ′ ⊆ N be an (α, λ)-significant group. Let r be the
ranking returned by Reverse SeqPAV. Then, there exists y ≥ λ such that avg(N ′, r≤y/α) ≥ y.
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Proof. Consider a set of voters N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| = n′, λ(N ′) ≥ λ. Let W , |W | = λ, be a set of
alternatives approved by all members of N ′. Let us consider the moment when Reverse SeqPAV
takes the first alternative from W and puts it in position k in the ranking. Let y denote the average
satisfaction of the voters, at this point; naturally, y ≥ λ.
The total approval score of the voters in N ′ gained from r≤k is at least equal to n′y, and by
Lemma 1 we infer wPAV (r≤k)− wPAV (r≤k) ≥ (n
′)2
n′y =
n′
y . By Lemma 2 with A
′ = r≤k, we get
that k ≤ nyn′ ≤ yα and since k is an interger k ≤ by/αc. This completes the proof.
5 Experimental Evaluation of Ranking Rules
The results from the previous section provide worst-case guarantees for several interesting rank-
ing rules. We would now like to complement these results with upper bounds, i.e., observed
“violations” of the justified demand of voter groups. To this end, we consider a large number of
synthetic and real-world preference data sets and analyze the representation offered by ranking
rules. In order to illuminate strengths and weaknesses of the ranking rules, the following very
diverse probability distributions and data sets are considered. In total, our experiments are based
on 315,500 instances.
Random subsets. In this model, votes are random subsets of the set of alternatives with the num-
ber of alternatives ranging from 4 to 14 and the number of voters ranging from 3 to 300.
We distinguish small profiles with 4 ≤ m ≤ 6 and 3 ≤ n ≤ 10, and large profiles with
9 ≤ m ≤ 14 and 20 ≤ n ≤ 300.
Spatial Model with Districts. In this model, we represent voters and alternatives as points in
two-dimensional Euclidean space [0, 1] × [0, 1]. In this space, we first place three districts
by randomly selecting a center point for each district. Each district defines a Gaussian
distribution over [0, 1]× [0, 1], centered at the district center point with a standard deviation
of 0.2 in both dimensions. For each district, we then sample a number of points representing
voters and alternatives according to this distribution. Each voter approves of all alternatives
within a radius of 0.4.
Urn Model. We consider 9 ≤ m ≤ 15 alternatives and 200 to 600 voters. For each voter, we
sample a ranking according to the Polya–Eggenberger Urn Model (Berg, 1985), and turn
this ranking into an approval set by letting the voter approve the first 5 to 8 alternatives of
the ranking. The rankings are sampled as follows. Consider an urn that initially contains
each of the m! possible rankings. The first voter’s ranking is picked uniformly at random
from the urn. To achieve some correlation between the rankings of different voters, we then
insert b copies (b > 1) of the selected ranking into the urn (we use b = 0.05 ·m!). Then the
second voter’s ranking is picked from the urn, again b copies are added to it, and so on.
Two groups. In this model, we randomly assign voters into two groups, where all members of the
same group approve the same alternatives. The approved alternatives of these two groups
may overlap.
Real-world data. We consider 346 real-world preference profiles from PrefLib (Mattei and
Walsh, 2013) consisting of rankings with ties withm ≤ 25 and n ≤ 2000. The approval sets
of voters consist of a certain number of their top-ranked alternatives (the concrete number
of approved alternatives in most cases varies between 1 and m/2; sometimes it exceeds m/2
due to ties).
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AV Greedy Chamberlin-Courant Phragme´n
5/4-Geometric RAV 2-Geometric RAV 10-Geometric RAV
SeqPAV Reverse SeqPAV Best-of
Figure 3: Violations of justified demand encountered in our data sets. The x-axis shows the pro-
portion of the respective group of voters, α(N ′), the y-axis the quotient of average representation
and justified demand, yr(N ′, k). Roughly, ranking rules with more gray points perform worse
according to our metrics; lower points correspond to more severe violations of proportionality.
Points to the left correspond to small groups, points to the right correspond to large groups with
unmet justified demand.
Measures of Quality of Group Representation
In our experiments we record every violation of justified demand: If, for a ranking r and an
integer k ≤ m, there exists a group N ′ with avg(N ′, r≤k) < jd(N ′, k), we plot a point at
(α(N ′), yr(N ′, k)) indicating this violation, where yr(N ′, k) =
avg(N ′,r≤k)
jd(N ′,k) . Figure 3 shows these
plots for different ranking rules. Violations displayed in the lower part of the plots have a small
ratio yr and thus are more severe. Note that several points may originate from the same ranking,
and that different rankings may produce the same point. Hence, these plots do not display how
often violations occur but rather in which regions (small/large groups, minor/major violations)
violations have been recorded.
Results of the Simulations
Let us start by analysing the plots of Figure 3. Approval Voting (AV) and greedy Chamberlin–
Courant (greedy CC) do not do well: while AV at least provides reasonable representation for
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real-world small large urn spatial 2 groups maxα
SeqPAV 5.0 % 0.8 % 34.3 % 10.0 % 40.0 % 0.0 % 0.67
AV 9.8 % 4.6 % 40.0 % 16.2 % 79.5 % 82.9 % 0.80
5/4-geom. RAV 6.6 % 1.5 % 36.1 % 13.0 % 62.8 % 22.4 % 0.80
2-geom. RAV 4.9 % 0.9 % 33.8 % 8.1 % 17.3 % 12.1 % 0.88
10-geom. RAV 11.6 % 0.9 % 42.3 % 29.9 % 72.5 % 13.9 % 0.88
Phragme´n 6.0 % 0.7 % 35.5 % 9.7 % 42.7 % 0.2 % 0.75
Rev. SeqPAV 5.0 % 0.7 % 36.9 % 10.7 % 41.2 % 0.0 % 0.67
Greedy CC 42.6 % 20.4 % 47.1 % 68.3 % 91.3 % 69.8 % 1.00
best-of 4.0 % 0.3 % 30.2 % 6.3 % 13.3 % 0.0 % 0.67
Table 1: Percentage of profiles with qP (r) < 1 for different categories of datasets: Random
Subsets with small profiles (small), Random Subsets with large profiles (large), Urn Model (urn),
Spatial Model (spatial), and Two Groups (2-groups). Column maxα shows the proportion α(N ′)
of the largest group N ′ with unfulfilled justifiable demand.
large groups (consistent with Theorem 2), greedy CC produces violations all across the spectrum.
This is not too surprising since greedy CC only cares about representing each voter by a single
alternative, and selects alternatives arbitrarily once this is achieved. We consider three geometric
RAV rules, for values of p in {5/4, 2, 10}. The 5/4-geometric RAV rule has characteristics similar
to AV (the second and third approved alternatives count almost as much as the first), while the
10-geometric RAV rule is similar to greedy CC (the first approved alternative counts the most).
The 2-Geometric RAV performs best, together with SeqPAV, Reverse SeqPAV, and Phragme´n’s
rule; it is hard to visually compare these rules with each other. We also added a “best-of” rule,
which selects whatever ranking r has the highest quality qP (r) out of those rankings generated by
our rules (but note that this is not the optimal ranking according to Definition 3).
The best rules according to 3 are thus 2-Geometric RAV, SeqPAV, Reverse SeqPAV, and
Phragme´n’s rule. In which contexts should we prefer to use each rule? To answer this question, it
is useful to compare their performance on instances obtained by the different distributions and data
sets we employed. First of all, all rankings produced by these rules have a similar quality in terms
of worst-case violations: the worst violations of all these rules were for yr(N ′, k) = 0.5. Con-
sequently, for all instances considered these rules provided qP (r) ≥ 0.5. A more discriminating
measure is the percentage of instances (of a given distribution) that have been solved perfectly, i.e.,
without violations. The results are summarized in Table 1. Notably, 2-geometric RAV achieves
perfection most frequently among the studied rules in four categories: real-world instances, large
profiles with random subsets, the urn model, and the spatial model. Its performance in the spatial
model is exceptional: it solves 82.7% of the instances without violations; the runner-up is SeqPAV
with 60.0%. The weakest category for 2-geometric RAV is “two groups”, where it solves 87.9%
without violations; SeqPAV and Reverse SeqPAV solve all instances obtained from this distribu-
tion without violations. For small profiles in the random subset category, Phragme´n’s rule and
Reverse SeqPAV perform best (99.3%), whereas SeqPAV and 2-Geometric RAV perform slightly
worse (99.2% and 99.1%, respectively).
The main strength of (Reverse) SeqPAV is the quality of their ranking for large groups: neither
of them has any violations for groups N ′ with α(N ′) > 2/3. For Phragme´n’s rule this value is 0.8
and for 2-Geometric RAV it is 0.88 (it is also visible in Figure 3 that 2-Geometric RAV has more
violations for large groups than, e.g., SeqPAV).
In conclusion, our experiments indicate that (i) 2-Geometric RAV, SeqPAV, Reverse SeqPAV,
and Phragme´n’s rule are the best-suited rules to generate proportional rankings among those con-
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sidered, and (ii) there is no single best among these four rules (the best-of rule outperforms
all of them). Unfortunately, the best-of rule is certainly not practical, as it is very expensive
to compute qP (r). Further experiments and theoretical results are required to determine which
(polynomial-time computable) rule is the best choice (for a given data set).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have formalized a fundamental problem that appears in many real-life applica-
tions: proportional rankings can provide diversified search results, can accommodate different
types of users in recommendation systems, can support decision-making processes under liquid
democracy, and can even produce committees with an internal hierarchical structure. Our formal-
ization of this problem allows us to leverage classical techniques from social choice and political
science to these modern application scenarios, and shine a new light on voting rules introduced as
far back as the 19th century.
After evaluating the proportionality of several appealing ranking rules both theoretically and
experimentally, we identified four such rules that appear to perform very well in this area: 2-
Geometric Reweighted Approval Voting, Sequential Proportional Approval Voting and its reverse
variant, and Phragme´n’s rule. However, none of these rules is single-best, and there remains a
need for an in-depth analysis to determine which rule is most applicable in which situation.
While all four of these rules are polynomial-time computable, we have shown that the optimal
rule (i.e. the rule that outputs rankings maximizing the quality measure qP ) is NP-hard to compute.
It would be desirable to develop ways in which this rule can be computed in reasonable time
for practical instances, and to search for other ranking rules that might provide an even better
approximation to the optimal rule than the rules we have identified in this work.
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